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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Cost reduction in the commercial operations of the
                                  Ethiopian Shipping Lines-a response to global competition
This dissertation looks at the possible cost saving areas in the commercial operations
of the Ethiopian Shipping Lines (ESL).  In the present competitive market, small
shipping companies like ESL will be able to survive and grow only if they establish
proper cost control and look for a potential savings by implementing cost effective
measures.
In this paper, attempts are made to examine and analyse the current situation of the
company and look for savings from port related expense, in particular from time
dependent wharfage/berthing dues, cargo handling and container related expenses.
Moreover, detailed comparison is also made on the feasibility of chartering-in
vessels vis-à-vis running own vessels, for one specific service route, namely the
Persian Gulf and Mumbai service route.  A brief look is taken at the unfavourable
situation for the national and regional niche players because of the ongoing global
trends.  Due to the on going global trend most of the national and regional small liner
operators; in particular those from the developing countries are on the verge of
disappearing from the liner trade.  Apparently ESL has already started facing severe
financial constraints.  Various data and statistics including operational reports of ESL
fleet and financial performance from the annual reports of the company are used
during the analysis.
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the most important points and analysis
discussed under the different chapters.
KEYWORDS: Control, Cost, Ethiopia, Plan, Reduction, Shipping
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1Chapter I
Introduction
Historically, it is probably true that the costs involved in running ships were modest
when compared with the revenue from freights.  Nowadays it is no more the case.  In
the present day shipping, freight rates are in general dominated by downward trend
whilst ship costs are still increasing. In view of this, the liner shipping is being
dictated by the need to reduce costs.
State owned shipping companies from the developing countries, like the Ethiopian
Shipping Lines, are facing all financial problems that states have.  Due to the limited
resources, most developing countries are not in a position to inject capital to their
shipping companies to keep abreast with the latest developments in the shipping
industry.  In the face of increasing competition and downward trend in freight rates,
there is little the Ethiopian Shipping Lines can do on the revenue part of its
operation.  The success and survival of the company is highly dependent on how cost
efficient it is.
As per the company’s recent restructuring programme, the marketing department is
in charge of the commercial operations.  The main tasks under the commercial
operations include scheduling, voyage and operational planning, sales and cargo
booking, follow-up of the day to day operations and appointment of agents and
stevedoring companies.  Procurement of bunkers, stores and supplies is handled by
the technical department.
2Presently, the Ethiopian Shipping Lines is operating under a competitive
environment.  The existing government as a result of the change in the economy
policy has waived the protection ESL used to enjoy in the form of cargo reservation.
Therefore, cost reduction is one of the most critical requirements for the survival of
ESL.  The commercial operation of ESL appears to suffer from lack of proper
voyage and operational planning and execution of plans.  Often schedules are not
adhered to.  Among other things, the liner shipping requires strict maintenance of
schedule and regularity. To this effect, it is vital for ESL to adhere to advertised
schedules in order to remain in the business.
During the last two years ESL has declared negative operating results from its liner
operation.  As freight rates are not expected to improve significantly for the
foreseeable future, it is high time for ESL to focus on minimising its overall costs.
The author of this dissertation has no reason to doubt about the need and possibility
of reducing costs in the technical operation of the company.  However, due the
author’s limited knowledge in the technical operations and the difficulties to gather
data, this paper was made to focus on the commercial operations of the company.
The goal of this dissertation is to pinpoint possible cost saving areas in the
commercial operations and assess the extent of savings.
Chapter II describes about the establishment, service routes, organisational structure,
fleet expansion and analysis of the current situation and the difficulties faced by
ESL.  The analysis comprises the effects of the continued downward trend in freight
rates and the change in the port of entry for the Ethiopian trade.  Moreover, it also
comprises analysis of the operational performance of the fleet which includes
capacity utilisation, time in port, scheduling and the financial performance of the
company.
Chapter III discusses the need for cost control in shipping and the different types of
cost control techniques applicable in any organisations with clear emphasis on
3budgeting and standard costing.  It also looks at the different ship costs namely,
operating costs, voyage costs, capital costs and cargo handling costs.
Chapter IV deals with detailed analysis of the possible cost savings from port
charges, cargo handling and container expenses.  The fleet performance and port
operation reports of some representative ports have been considered for the purpose
of analysis.  Furthermore, efforts have been made to show the extent of savings from
the proposed cost saving areas.  It also looks at the feasibility and possibility of
chartering-in vessels for the Red Sea/Persian Gulf service route as an alternative
strategy.
Chapter V examines the global trends and their effects on the liner shipping in
general and the national and regional niche players in particular.  The global trends
under discussion include globalisation, alliances, mergers, acquisitions, deregulation,
increasing vessel size and logistics management.  It also examines the challenges for
ESL vis-à-vis the global trends.
Finally chapter VI summarises the most important points and analysis discussed in
the previous chapters.
The author undertook this research to highlight the need for cost reduction scheme in
the commercial operations of ESL, as it is one of the key success factors in the
present shipping environment.  As far as practicable, all attempts have been made to
make use of relevant latest publications and statistical figures.  However, the main
obstacles faced in the elaboration of the dissertation have been lack of literature
directly related to the topic and the difficulties to obtain experiences from the various
field trips and visits to the major shipping companies, as their business philosophy
and scope of operation is completely different from that of ESL.
4Chapter II
Background
The Ethiopian shipping lines (here after called as ESL) was established in 1964, as a
joint venture, with 51% owned by an American company and 49% by the Ethiopian
government.  It started operation in 1966 with three newly built ships, consisting of
two general cargo ships of 6550 dwt each and one oil tanker of 34075 dwt capacity.
Subsequently the American Company sold its share to the ministry of finance and
ESL became fully Ethiopianised in 1969.  The emergence of ESL has the following
objectives
- To facilitate the nation’s external trade by providing reliable maritime transport.
- To earn and save foreign exchange that would have been paid out to foreign ship
owners.
- To create job and opportunities to acquaint young Ethiopians with marine
technology and tradition.
- To promote self-sufficiency and self-reliance.
The dry cargo vessels were deployed on a liner service between Red Sea and
Northwest European ports while the tanker was chartered out.
2.1 Fleet expansion
Upon commencement of operations, ESL had faced severe competition from well-
established foreign lines. However, after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, most
of the foreign lines seized calling at Ethiopian ports due to long voyage time via the
Cape. In the course of time, ESL purchased four second hand vessels because of
increase of demand for additional shipping spaces.  ESL was still not in a position to
5meet the country’s demand for maritime transport and was forced to charter-in
additional tonnage to supplement its shipping service.
The profitability of ESL was adversely affected during the first seven years due to
the long voyage via the Cape and various other factors.  However, this situation
reversed and the company started showing reasonable profits in 1974 which it has
been able to maintain there after. In1974, the then government re-established the
Ethiopian Shipping Line by writing off the accumulated loses and adopted supportive
measures in the form of cargo reservation.  ESL had enjoyed cargo reservation policy
until the downfall of the military government in 1991. The present strength of the
fleet is eleven cargo ships and one product tanker.
Table 2.1
ESL fleet in 2000
Vessel Type Year built Dwt container
Abbay wonz Multi purpose 1984 15107 363
Abyot Multi purpose 1985 15107 363
Andinet Multi purpose 1985 14895 367
Netsanet Multi purpose 1985 14895 367
Admas Multi purpose 1986 13593 302
Tekeze Multi purpose 1990 18145 930
Karamara Roro 1976 2428 54
Meskerem* Roro 1978 3276 112
Omowonz Roro 1981 3500 112
Keiy kokeb General cargo 1977 4135 152
Wolwol General cargo 1977 4135 152
Awash Product tanker 1989 3618 -
Source: ESL
*Meskerem has been laid up since June 1998
6In May 1991, the present government took power from the Marxist military
government and Eritrea got separated from Ethiopia with the two ports, Assab and
Massawa.  At present Ethiopia is one of the land locked countries in the continent.
The present government had adopted free market economy policy and ESL is no
more in a position to enjoy the protectionist policy, which it used to have during the
previous regime.
2.2 Service routes
Thirty four years ago ESL launched its first service along the UK/ North West
Europe, which was then the major sector of the country’s import and export trade.  In
the course of its development ESL has further expanded its service routes to include
the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea regions, the Far East areas and the Persian Gulf
region in view of the growing traffic movements on these routes.
In the Red Sea areas too, ESL provides coastal services mainly to the port of Jeddah
and is also engaged in petroleum product transfer operation. At present ESL uses the
port of Djibouti as its base and provides liner services to specific ports abroad on
regular sailing schedules.  Subject to sufficient inducement, ESL ships also call at
other ports enroute.  Table 2.2 presents advertised ports of call and service
frequency.
2.3 Organisation
The Ethiopian shipping line is managed by a general manager who is responsible to
the board of directors. He is responsible for carrying out the board’s directions
dealing with all major policy issues including finance, senior executive
appointments, introduction of new services and major decisions of capital
expenditure including acquisition of new and second hand tonnage.
The organisation is departmental where by the line’s all activities are split up in to
various departments.  At present ESL has representative offices in Rotterdam, Dubai,
7Tianjin and Djibouti.  At present the total number of shore based and sea-going
personnel stands at about 530.  The organisational chart is presented in figure 2.1.
Table 2.2
Advertised service schedule
Service route Ports of call Service frequency
Red Sea/North Europe Lehavre
Antwerp
Rotterdam
Bremen
M’brough
Hamburg
Uddevalla
Gdynia
Every 3 weeks
Red Sea/Mediterranean Livorno
Barcelona
Every 3 weeks
Red Sea/F. East/E. Africa Yokohama
Osaka
Kobe
Bussan
Tianjin
Singapore
Mombassa
Every 4 weeks
RedSea/PersianGulf&
Indian sub continent
Sharjah
Mumbai
Every 2 weeks
Red Sea/Adriatic On inducement
Source: ESL
8Figure 2.1
Organisational chart of ESL
Source: ESL
2.4 Analysis of current situation
Under the existing government the national cargo preference which ESL used to
enjoy in the past, have been removed and ESL is required to be efficient and
profitable and improve its capability to operate in a competitive environment.  In the
face of, increasing competition on all its service routes, declining freight rate levels,
escalating operating costs and the need of having to replace the greater part of its
ageing fleet with in the next few years, the company appears to be at a critical stage
of its development.
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92.4.1 Depressed freight rate levels
Due to the globalisation and liberalisation of world trade as well as the introduction
of free market economy policy in the country, situations became more challenging
for ESL because of increasing competition.  In the last few years freight rates have
been pushed down to their lowest level.  For instance, prior to 1996 the sea freight
for one twenty-foot container from the port of Assab to Yokohama was USD 2300.
However, in 1996, in order to match the competition, ESL was forced to revise its
rate to USD 1350, a decrease by about 59%.  Similarly the freight rate from Assab to
various ports in the North continent and Mediterranean region has decreased from
US$ 1950 to US$ 1350 for 1x 20 container.  Substantial rate decrease has also been
noted on the inward cargo during the same period.
The effect of the decrease in freight rates can easily be seen by comparing the line’s
nine months performance during the 1996/97-budget year (July 1st 1996 to march
31st 1997) against the same period of 1995/96-budget year. During the 9 months of
1996/97, the Ethiopian shipping line transported a total of 342703 tons of cargo
comprising 34513 tons of export and 308190 tons of import cargo.  While in 1995/96
the total cargo carried by ESL stood at 325411 tons, comprising 23571 tons of out
bound and 301840 tons of inbound cargo. The total cargo lifted during the nine
months in 1996/97 has increased by about 5.3%.
When it is split in to outbound and inbound cargo, the outbound cargo has shown an
increase by 46% and the inbound cargo increased by 2%.   How ever, during
1996/97, the gross revenue on the export side has increased by only 18% and the
import cargo gross revenue has shown a decrease by 8% against the same period of
the 1995/96-budget year.  The overall gross revenue has decreased by 2% despite an
increase in the total cargo lifted.  The situation has even become worst after May
1998 when the gateway for the Ethiopian trade has shifted to Djibouti, though the
country as a whole has benefited due to very competitive rates to and from Djibouti.
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In addition to the shift in base port, the 1998 Asian crisis has also contributed to the
decrease in the revenue to a certain extent.
Figure 2.2
 Source: ESL data
Figure 2.3
Source: ESL data
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Figure 2.4
 Source: ESL data
Prior to May 1998, the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa used to serve as the
main gateway for the Ethiopian trade.  Assab and Massawa have no dedicated
container terminal.  The fact that they are conventional ports equipped with shore
mounted cranes, has made these ports suitable for the type of vessels ESL operates.
While the competitor lines mainly container operators, serve Assab and Massawa
mainly through the hub ports of Djibouti and Jeddah.
The shifting of Ethiopian trade from the ports of Assab and Massawa to Djibouti has
brought ESL in to direct competition with the bigger international container
operators who provide regular sailing frequency from Europe and Asia to the port of
Djibouti.  Due to the shift in port of entry for the Ethiopian trade, all competing lines,
which used to serve the Ethiopian trade through Assab and Massawa by way of
transhipment, have managed to save about USD 400 to 500 from the container
handling alone. That is,
               -Loading on to the feeder vessel at Djibouti USD 115/teu
               -Terminal handling and tallying at Djibouti about USD 115/teu
               -Discharging from the feeder vessel at Assab USD 100/teu
               -Shore handling at Assab USD 100/teu
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The above estimated saving is computed on the assumption that containers will be
connected to the feeder vessel within the allowed free storage time. In addition to the
savings from the container handling, the operators have also managed to save:
♦ All costs connected with the running of feeder vessels. That is, operating, capital
or daily charter hire and voyage costs of feeder vessels.
♦  Costs connected with the repositioning of empty boxes from Assab and
Massawa to Djibouti, as the number of containers on the inward leg by far
exceeds the number of out bound boxes from Assab and Massawa.
Therefore, due to the cost reduction and that of exploiting economies of scale by
handling large volumes, the competitor lines have been able to provide a higher
quality service at lower competitive container rate than ESL. As a result, the need to
compete with the big container operators has seriously affected ESL’ financial
performance.
In view of the above, the freight rate of one teu from north European ports to
Djibouti has gone down from USD 1400 to about USD 800. Moreover, the shift in
the port of entry to Djibouti with its container terminal, has assisted the trend of
containerisation of general cargo bound to Ethiopia which gives competitor lines
higher competitive advantage over ESL. The situation was further aggravated by the
1998 Asian crisis. Unsurprisingly, the effect of economic turm oil in Asia has
manifested it self in decreasing freight rates and lower charter revenues. Therefore,
competitor lines operating in the main east/west trade were willing to accept very
low freight rate from European ports to Djibouti during their eastbound leg.
2.4.2 Operational performance
The Ethiopian Shipping Line fleet comprises twelve ships of about 110000 dead
weight tons (see details of vessels particulars in page 5).  The average age of the fleet
in terms of the number of ships is about 17 years. The core of the fleet, which is
13
about 84% of the fleet capacity in terms of dead weight, was built in the mid 80s and
early 90. This part consists six multi purpose vessels.
The operational flexibility in terms of the range of cargo they can carry has made
these vessels the corner stone for ESL. The remaining are two late 70s built general
cargo vessels, three similar age small ro/ro ships and one late 80-built product
carrier. Out of the three ro/ro vessels, ro/ro Meskerem, has been put up for sale and is
at Djibouti anchorage since June 1998 waiting for suitable candidate to buy her.
The fleet has a total container loading capacity of 3274 teus.  The flexible nature of
the fleet has made ESL capable of handling a wide range of cargoes.  The larger
multi purpose vessels (namely Netsanet, Tekeze, Abbay wonz, Andinet, Admas,
Abyot) are equipped with cranes which enable them to handle loaded twenty foot and
forty foot units from most holds. The smaller general cargo vessels have lower
capacity cargo handling equipment in line with non-containerised parcel
requirements. The ro/ro vessels have limited general cargo handling equipment as
they were originally designed for handling wheeled cargo.
The designed service speed of the larger vessels is around 15 knots and that of other
ships is around 10 knots.  With the exception of m/v Tekeze, the remaining vessels
though generally in good condition, are requiring increased maintenance.  Currently
ESL owns about 2500 twenty equivalent units. The company also leases a varying
number of boxes to meet operational requirements.
2.4.2.1 Capacity utilisation
Like any other liner companies ESL also deals with imbalance of trade in its four
service routes. The North continent service, which is the main operation of ESL, is
maintained by the six multi purpose vessels.  Each vessel normally calls at about four
or five European ports.  In 1998/99, on an average, each vessel loaded about 7300
tons of general cargo including containers and vehicles during their southbound leg
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and about 1000 tons during their northbound leg.  Under the cost reduction scheme,
the Mediterranean service is presently covered by the vessels operating in the north
continent ports during their north and southbound legs.
The Far East service is provided through the switching of an appropriate number of
the north continent scheduled multi purpose vessels on to a Far East route. In
1998/99 westbound parcel size per ship averaged 7150 tons consisting of break-bulk
shipments, containers and vehicles, where as the east bound was almost nil. The
Persian Gulf and Indian sub continent service has been maintained using the four
smaller vessels. Westbound shipment averaged 2000 tons of combined cargo where
as the east bound cargo averaged 200 tons per vessel.
Table 2.3
ESL fleet capacity utilisation during 1997/98 & 1998/99
Service route 1997/98 1998/99
North continent
         Out bound
         In bound
21%
63%
9%
68%
Mediterranean
          Out bound
          In  bound
7%
56%
2% *
59% *
Far east
          Out bound
          In  bound
1%
64%
1%
77%
Gulf
          Out bound
          In  bound
2%
79%
4%
67%
Source: ESL data
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*Shows six months performance by m/v Keiy Kokeb and Wolwol in the first half of
the year.  In the second half of the year, these two vessels were pulled out and the
service route was covered by the North continent vessels.
2.4.2.2 Time in port
One of the disadvantages in operating general cargo and multi purpose vessels is the
relatively longer stay in ports. In view of this, the Ethiopian shipping line service
seems to suffer from a high level of port related delays. The ships on north continent
and far east services, on an average spent equal time in port and at sea.  Those on the
gulf service spent about 65 percent of the service time in port and the balance 35%,
at sea.
2.4.2.3 Scheduling
One of the operational features of liner shipping is to be able to provide transport
services with fixed sailing schedules. The norm of the present day liner shipping has
in fact become fixed day weekly service. Hence adherence to the advertised sailing
schedule is very critical for the reliability of a liner company. In 1998 the average
arrival variance for the different service routes was as follows: -
- North continent trade route about 6 days
- Mediterranean trade route about 4 days
- Far east trade route about 7 days
- Gulf service about 4 days
Average arrival variance at Djibouti during 1998 has been 5 days while the average
sailing variance was noted to be about 8 days. The low productivity and
concentration of calls at Djibouti has significantly increased the departure variance.
2.4.3 Financial performance
Despite the fierce competition and depressed freight rate levels ESL had managed to
enjoy positive operating results until 1996/97-budget year. In 1997/98 the company
16
showed its first disappointing result. Figure 2.5 presents the net profit/loss of ESL in
the past seven years.
Figure 2.5
Source: ESL data
As can be seen from the above figure, ESL made a loss of about USD 1.5 million
in1997/98 and about 2.5 million USD in 1998/99. (As the exchange rate varies from
time to time, an average rate of Ethiopian birr 7 & 7.6 to US dollar has been
considered for both years respectively). Table 2.4 shows the balance sheet of the
company as of June 30 1999.
Having seen the balance sheet it seems the company is in a critical financial
condition. The current and quick ratios clearly indicate that the company is not in a
position to meet its immediate obligations.
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Table 2.4
Balance sheet as of June 30, 1999
Cash
Receivables
inventory
65699000
46420000
8000000
Long term loan
current maturity
Provision and
accruals
Other acc.payables
88075000
31649000
68169000
Total current asset 120119000 Total current liab 187893000
Net fixed asset
Investment
Deferred charge
229135000
30000
23891000
Long term loan
State capital
Un-appropriated
surplus
86412000
81867000
17003000
Total fixed asset 253056000 185282000
Total asset 373175000 Total laib&equity 373175000
Source: ESL
With the on going decreasing trend in freight rate and escalating operating costs the
future looks consequently bad. Hence it is high time for ESL to look at its financial
performance. There are two alternatives to improve the financial status
A. increase the revenue
B. reduce the costs
As “item A” is not with in the scope of this paper, the author of this paper will only
focus on cost reduction and possible cost saving areas. “The best way to make money
is to stop losing it.”
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Chapter III
Cost control
A paper presented by Patrick Donner on the Essential Maritime Transport, Cost
Control defines cost as “The price we pay for making or producing goods and
services or the price we pay for obtaining goods and services”. Among other things,
the primary concern of any business enterprise is to maximise its profit in order to
grow and expand.  Profit can be maximised by either increasing the revenue or
decreasing the cost or applying both simultaneously.
Profit = Revenue - Cost
Cost can be characterised by the word sacrifice and is in the management’s interest
to control and reduce the sacrifices involved in achieving desired results where
possible.  In the broader sense costs are equivalent to sacrifices of various types as:
♦ Non financial costs: costs which are not directly traceable through the company’s
cash flow statement, for instance lowering of morale of employees due to
dissatisfaction.
♦ Non cash costs: costs, which are financial sacrifice that do not involve cash out
lays. E.g. depreciation.
♦ Cash costs: costs that are reflected in actual cash out lays.
Costs can also be distinguished as direct and indirect costs or variable and fixed
costs.  Direct costs are costs that are specifically related to a given cost unit and
indirect costs are costs, which are not specifically related to a given cost unit.
Variable costs are costs that change in accordance with the level of activity and have
a different behavioural pattern from fixed costs that only vary with time. One of the
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key success factors in today’s business environment is cost leadership.  In view of
this, business enterprises have to make use of their limited resources in a more
efficient and effective way in order to remain competitive. In order to ensure
maximum efficiency and effectiveness, managers need to plan, organise, implement
and control.  Controlling is a vital managerial function and is concerned with such
tasks as setting goals and objectives, drawing plans and assessing their
accomplishment, measuring actual performance against established targets and
standards and identifying and rectifying as required, any deviations between actual
and desired performance. The existence of control process helps management to
know the position of the organisation in relation to a predetermined future position.
Henri Fayol defines control as “ In an undertaking, control consists of verifying
whether everything occurs in conformity with the plan adopted, the instructions
issued and principles established.  It has an objective to point out weaknesses and
errors to rectify them and prevent recurrence.  It operates on everything, things,
people and actions”.
Figure 3.1
The process of controlling
Source: principles of management handout
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In short, cost control is concerned with keeping costs at their planned level.  That is,
conforming in so far as possible to the existing standards and plans.  Hence control
and planning are complementary to each other.  Information is the basis and
prerequisite for the success of effective cost control.  With respect to this, accounting
reports shall be presented in such a way that those related with cost incurrance could
understand them fully and react to them as may be appropriate.  More over, all
concerned with cost incurrance and cost control should be able to get the right
information at the right time and in the right place.  Information pertaining to actual
results should be related to a yardstick of performance, a predetermined plan, budget
or standard.  In the absence of this comparison there can be no meaningful basis for
evaluating achievements and hence no effective way of controlling.
How ever the term right information does not necessarily or always mean that the
information must be 100 percent correct.  Information is right when it has the right
effect at the time of decision for the person who is to decide.  There are different
types of cost control techniques applicable in different organisations.  Such
techniques include responsibility accounting, cost accounting, differential costing,
discounting techniques, budgeting, standard costing, etc.  However, the most widely
spread and commonly used tools of cost control are budgeting and standard costing.
Budgeting is an essential management tool used for short term planning and control.
Traditionally budgeting was intended for restricting expenditure. But a much more
useful and constructive way of looking at is to treat the budgeting process as a means
for achieving the most effective and profitable use of the company’s resources
through planning and control.  The following are the steps involved in budgeting in
order to secure control over performance and cost.
♦ Preparing of budgets.
♦ Comparing actual cost and achievement against budgets.
♦ Taking remedial actions.
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Standard costing or standard costs are costs that should be achieved under efficient
operations.  They are predetermined costs, which can be used as a benchmark against
the actual costs.
3.1 Design of a cost control system
There is no standard or specific system of cost control that can be applied for all
organisations.  The system designed should perfectly fit the organisation for which it
is intended.  However, the following points need to be considered at the time of
designing and installing a cost control system.
♦ Priority to be given to the speed of information. Unless the right data are
available in time to influence results, one does not have management at all.
♦ The system should be adapted to the size, structure and operation of the
organisation and must be simple and easy to operate.
♦ The cost of installing and maintaining the system.
♦ The system must be fully supported by the top management.
♦ The system must be integrated with other systems in operation.
♦ The system should consist clear and detailed procedures and include reporting
to various levels directly or indirectly concerned with the problems.
3.2 Ship costs- an overview and a brief introduction
So far there is no internationally accepted standard of cost classification in shipping.
There are various criteria of cost classification.    However the most commonly used
approach is to classify ship costs into four categories.
3.2.1Operating costs
Operating costs are those costs, which the ship owner has to meet no matter where, if
or how the vessel is trading.  Some times they are referred as daily running costs.
Such costs constitute manning, stores and lubricants, repairs and maintenance
including periodic dry-docking, insurance and overhead costs.
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♦ Manning costs: manning costs are mainly influenced by the type of vessel, the
degree of automation, the regulations of the flag registry, the nationality of the
crew and how much on-board maintenance is required. The minimum crew
requirements are set by the safety aspects of sailing a ship as defined by the
International Maritime Organisation.  Apart from that, flag states that is,
countries under whose flag a ship is registered may impose additional
requirements.  The nationality of the crew is another important issue in
determining manning costs. American or European crew are more expensive than
their counter parts from the developing counties.  The degree of automation and
the amount of maintenance required on-board are also important factors affecting
the manning cost.  That is, the more automated the less number of crew required.
The size of the crew is directly related to the amount of maintenance required on-
board.  Crew costs are generally divided into three groups:
            Wages: basic pay, overtime, special work payments, leave pay, social
security, bonuses, etc.
            Travel costs: fares, perdiem subsistence allowance, baggage etc.
            Other costs: medical expenses, training, clothing, etc.
♦ Stores and lubricants: stores can be divided into deck, engine and catering or
victuals.  They are expenditures necessary to maintain the ship and to feed the
crew.  Apart from victuals they are mainly ropes, wires, paints, grease and spares.
Lubricating oils are an essential part of the engine room stores.  They are
expensive and dependent upon the sailing periods of the ship.  Lubricating oil
costs tend to increase with the age of the ship.
♦ Maintenance and repair costs: Maintenance can be categorised into routine
maintenance of such items as main engine, cranes, painting of the hull and
maintenance that is required to keep the ship in class.  A ship has to be repaired
when breakdown or damage occurs.  Maintenance and repair costs are usually
higher on older vessels, given the natural ageing process and the increased
23
stringency of checks on older vessels.  During low freight rates, this is the area in
which ship owners first start to cut the corners, as some of the expenditures are
only required for preventive maintenance.
♦ Insurance cost: a ship has to be insured against all sorts of risks.  The factors,
which most affect the cost of insurance, are the actual value of the ship and the
scope of coverage.  Premium paid by the ship owner is the cost of insurance.  The
ship owner’s most basic insurance covers are hull & machinery (H&M) and
protection and indemnity (P&I).  In special circumstances the ship owner may
insure the ship against war risks, loss of hire, etc. The hull and machinery
insurance covers all the physical aspects of the ship; hull, equipment and
machinery. In which the owner has a direct insurable interest.  The risks are
placed with underwriters in the insurance market. The premium depends on
various factors such as the flag of the ship, age, type, size, claim history, crew,
management, trading area, etc.  P & I covers the shipowner for liabilities
emanating directly from the operation of the ship.  This invariably tends to be
third party claims from cargo owners, crew, port authorities or environmental
agencies, etc.  Traditionally, P&I has been covered by mutual insurance between
shipowners handled by the P&I clubs.
♦ Overhead costs: the shipowner has to manage the technical operations,
commercial operations, crewing and other administrative functions which are
required to run a ship.  The whole of these management functions are called
administration or overhead and the expenditures as overhead costs.
3.2.2 Voyage costs
Voyage costs are costs directly related to a particular voyage of a ship. They
comprise fuel or bunker costs, port charges and canal dues, if a vessel is transiting
through a canal.
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♦ Bunker costs: Fuel is the most dominant single cost item in the running of ships.
The fuel consumption of a ship is dependent on various factors such as the size of
the ship, the condition of ship’s hull, the laden condition, the speed of the ship,
the weather, the type and capacity of the main engine and auxiliaries, the type of
fuel and the quality of fuel.  Bunker costs depend on the quantity of fuel
consumed and the price of the fuel oil.  The price of fuel is determined by the
world oil price and the location where the fuel is taken on-board.  As the volume
of oil varies with the temperature, the ship owner has to keep on monitoring the
temperature of the fuel while bunkering.  Moreover, the quality of the fuel oil has
to be specified and tested to ensure optimum engine performance.
♦ Port charges: port charges comprise berth dues, towage, pilotage, light dues,
wharf dues and many other costs connected with arrival, port stay and departure
of the ship.  These charges are mainly dependent on the time spent in ports,
ship’s size and the applicable tariff rate in a particular port and vary widely from
port to port.  There is little a shipowner can do about these charges, as he cannot
avoid them.  However, a fast turn-round service and proper scheduling of
voyages to avoid unnecessary waiting in ports can reduce the amount of these
costs significantly.
♦ Canal dues: canal dues are paid when ships are transiting through the canal.  The
most important and commonly used are the Suez and Panama canals.  Canal dues
are charged according to the size of the vessel, the laden condition (whether in
ballast or laden) and the cost of alternative routes for the canal.
3.2.3 Capital costs:
Capital costs are basically related to the acquisition of a vessel.  They are dependent
on various factors.  Some of which are:
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♦ The new building or second-hand price of the ship, which is highly influenced by
the freight market condition and other costs related to acquisition of the ship.
♦ The financing arrangement that is, how much money is borrowed and how much
is the owner's own capital.
♦ The interest rate for borrowed money which depends on the size of the loan, the
solidity of the owner, the collateral offered and the general level of interest rates.
♦ The opportunity cost for own capital, that is, the return that would have been
generated by investing the capital in some other projects.
♦ The economic life of the ship.
  In short, capital costs are determined by the depreciation, interest payment and
return on owner’s equity.
3.2.4 Cargo handling costs
Cargo handling costs are expenses incurred in loading, discharging, stowing,
trimming, lashing, securing, weighing, etc.  These costs are determined by such
elements as the type of commodity, the quantity, the ship type, the terminal and port
characteristics.  Labour is the principal element of cargo handling cost. Its costs vary
from port to port and are usually higher in ports with skilled and efficient work
forces than in poorly equipped ports.
3.3 Cost control in shipping
Historically it is probably true that costs involved in operating ships were tolerable
and acceptable when compared with the freight revenue.  Hence ship owners or
shipping companies had managed to have reasonable profit margins which enabled
them to re-invest on additional vessels, as the price of new vessels was affordable at
that time.  Nowadays it is no more the case.  The traditional shipping industry has
become increasingly exposed to prevailing fierce industry competition.  Practically
it has become difficult to make sustained profits in the shipping industry.  In today’s
shipping the profit margins earned, if at all there is a profit is very small.  Due to this
fact many shipping companies including giant global players are declaring
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disappointing operating results.  The following expression taken from the monthly
Containerisation International highlights the situation in a more profound manner.
 “The liner shipping industry has been lamenting abysmal financial performance
since the age of clipper ships.  During testimony before the US congress in May
1999 on anti-trust aspects of the ocean shipping reform act of 1998 evidence was
presented that the return on equity of the liner shipping industry was only about 2%
on average from 1993 through 1997.” (Containerisation International, September
1999).
As we are living in a time of dynamic global growth and development, shipping
companies have to establish strategies on improving the basic service to the
customer at a lower cost to the operator.  The success of a shipping company will
largely depend on how best it can utilise its resources and cost control is an essential
tool to achieve better utilisation of resources.  Moreover, shipping is an industry of
international character; a huge percentage of earnings are spent abroad for running
ships.  Therefore, it is of a vital importance for a shipping company to analyse and
adjust its cost elements.  What is required is not only a preventive action (cost
control) but a corrective action (cost reduction).  In view of this it is necessary to:
♦ Examine all costs related to the acquisition and operating of ships.
♦ Review standards for operating cost.
♦ Review standards for operating performance.
♦ Identify areas of operation where the standards are not achieved.
♦ Take corrective actions based on variances from desired performance.
In this respect it might be necessary to modify the existing system or develop a new
one.  As freight rates are driven down due to fierce global competition, the only way
to check rising operational cost is to establish proper cost control and look for a
potential savings by implementing cost effective measures.  Moreover, it is
imperative for the shipping industry to take maximum advantage of every possible
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technique of cost control.  A planned programme of cost control is an invaluable aid
to the industry in increasing its efficiency and effectiveness.
The role of cost control in the shipping industry begins before the decision to
acquire a vessel is taken.  A large number of the costs depend upon decisions taken
with respect to the type of the vessel, its suitability for the intended trade, its size,
design, tonnage and technology some of which will be reflected in the manning
costs and others in the operating costs like repair and maintenance, bunker
consumption and cargo handling costs.
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Chapter IV
Possible cost saving areas in the commercial operations of ESL
In chapter III we looked at the various types of ship costs in brief. Namely, capital,
voyage, cargo handling and operating costs.  Unlike tramp shipping, in liner trade
almost all ship costs except those of cargo handling are fixed costs.  A liner operator
is committed to provide fixed service at regular intervals between named ports.
Hence fixed itinerary in a regular service, to sail whether filled or not, on the date
specified on the schedule are what distinguish liner shipping from tramp.  In this
respect, expenses such as bunker cost, port charge and canal dues which fall under
the variable cost in the tramp shipping are fixed costs under the liner shipping.  Due
to this fact the organisational requirement and cost structure of a liner operator is
quite different from a tramp operator.
Establishing a cost control system is not an end objective by it self.  What is
important in the present day shipping is to be able to provide quality service to the
customer at a lower cost to the operator.  In the present competitive market situation,
cost reduction and cost leadership are very vital for the survival and success of a
shipping company.  Therefore, it is high time for ESL to exert maximum degree of
control over its operating, voyage and cargo handling costs in order to achieve
positive operating results and ensure its survival and long term growth.
Unfortunately the existing trend of economic globalisation, mergers, alliances and
acquisition has forced small national shipping companies like ESL to reach their
critical stage of development.  It is very unlikely that these shipping companies can
be part of groupings of big shipping lines for they don’t have similar business
philosophies and scale of operation, as main line container ships supported by feeder
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services are often required to come together to form alliances.  During the last few
years ESL made disappointing operating results due to low freight rates and
escalating costs. Figure 4.1 below presents the poor operating results during the last
three fiscal years.
Figure 4.1
Revenue verses cost
        Source: ESL data
This chapter looks at some possible cost saving areas in the commercial operations of
ESL.
4.1 Port charges
Expenses incurred with in a port fall into one of the two categories, those attributable
to the vessel and those related to the cargo.  In tramp shipping the responsibility for
cargo related costs depends on the charter arrangement under which the ship is being
employed, very often concluded on free in free out (FIO) basis.  However, in liner
shipping, all cargo related costs come under the operator.  Port charges include
wharfage or berthing dues, light dues, mooring/unmooring, towage or provision of
tug assistance, pilotage, lock entry/exit costs, etc.
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It is probably true that there is little a shipowner can do on port tariffs as they are
official tariffs levied against some ship measure which could be related to dwt, gt, nt,
etc.  Very often, items such as berthing or wharfage dues are charged as a rate per
day or fraction thereof.  Nevertheless in privately owned and operated berths the
tariffs for berths and other related services such as tug assistance and
mooring/unmooring could still be open for negotiation.
In 1998/99 fiscal year, ESL paid Birr 17,380,000 (USD about 2,286,842) for port
related expenses, out of which about 50% is estimated to be wharfage or berthing due
expenses.  Table 4.1 below presents break down of the voyage cost during the
1998/99 fiscal year.
Table 4.1
Voyage cost breakdown during 1998/99
‘000 BIRR
Bunker cost 21323 34.6%
Port charge 17380 28.2%
Canal due 22934 37.2%
Total voyage cost 61637 100%
Source: ESL data
As the berthing/wharfage fee is often time dependent, that is, the longer the berth
time the higher the berth charge and vice versa, it can be reduced by decreasing the
period or time the ship stays at berth.  ESL has a long-standing relationship with the
most ports its vessels are calling at.  Some ports like Hamburg and Bremen have
been served by ESL for not less than thirty years.  These ports are still the regular
ports of call for ESL vessels. This paper will mainly focus on ports where possible
cost savings could be realised.  However, before discussing the possible cost savings,
a quick preview of the tariff structures of some representative ports deserves
mention.
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The structure of port tariffs in the North continent ports vary from port to port
significantly.  In ports like Antwerp, Uddevalla and Middlesborough the berthing fee
is fixed, irrespective of the time vessels stay in port.  Where as in others like
Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam the berthing fee is directly proportional to the
vessels stay in port.  Table 4.2 below shows berthing due tariffs of North continent
ports applicable for ESL vessels.
Table 4.2
Berthing due tariffs of representative North continent ports
Port Applicable tariff
Uddevalla SEK 4.10 per gross tonnage and additional charge SEK 0.90 per
gross tonnage for vessels using bunkers with sulphur content
above 1%.
Antwerp BF 21.8 per gross tonnage.
Middelsborough UK pound sterling 6386 per ship call
Bremen DM 0.73 per gross tonnage per day
Hamburg DM 0.73 per gross tonnage per day
Rotterdam DFL 5.5 x LOA x no of days
 Source: ESL data
In ports like Uddevalla, Antwerp, and Middelsbrough ESL’s contracts seem to
provide for all-in rates.  Hence, no savings can be made by reducing vessels berth
time.  The only way to minimise the berthing or wharfage due in these ports is to re-
negotiate the fixed rates during the annual agency meeting.  In ports like Hamburg,
Bremen and Rotterdam fast turn-around of vessels could really make substantial
amount of savings.  In some ports, in addition to the time related wharfage due there
is also a fixed charge known as harbour due levied on vessels irrespective of the
duration of stay. The berthing charge in the Japanese and Korean ports has both fixed
and time dependent components.  Port due which is a fixed sum per gt per call and
dockage due which varies with the duration of stay in berth.  While in the Chinese
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port of Tianjin berthing charge is a fixed sum based on the vessel’s net tonnage.  In
the Red Sea port of Djibouti and Mumbai the berthing charges are time dependent,
based on the vessels gross tonnage and the duration of stay in berth.  In addition to
the normal tariffs, the various ports do apply surcharges for the services and work
done during the weekends, night hours and outside the normal weekday working
hours. Applicable surcharges of some representative ports are presented in table 4.3
below.
Table 4.3
Surcharges of representative ports
Port Type of service Over time Surcharge
Yokohama Pilotage, Towage &
Mooring/Unmooring
1630-2200hrs
2200-0600hrs
0600-0830hrs
Holidays
+ 60%
+ 110%
+ 70%
+ 50%
Bussan Pilotage, Towage &
Mooring/Unmooring
Night time
Holidays
Noon off hours
2400-0400hrs
+ 50%
+ 50%
+ 50%
+ 100%
Tianjin Pilotage, Towage &
Mooring/Unmooring
Holidays, normal working days
night shift
Holidays night hours
+ 50%
+ 100%
Rotterdam Towage
    “
Mooring/Unmooring
Friday 1700hrs till Monday
0700hrs
1700hrs the day before holiday
till 0700hrs the day after such
holiday
Weekends & holiday
+ 25%
+ 25%
+ 35%
 Source: ESL data
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4.1 The need for operational planning and standard setting
In depressed freight markets, erosion of earnings by port charges could be significant
and provide unpleasant operating results.  With no sign of freight rate improvement,
they may be en route to becoming a serious concern.  “The best way to make money
is to stop losing it” appears to be a good proverb in particular for small national
shipping companies like ESL.
As cost control is a key to survival, ESL needs to properly plan the cargo operations
of its vessels, set out performance standards and evaluate actual performance against
standards.  The company’s scheduling procedures should be based on the
performance standards established and any variations need to be analysed and timely
corrected.
It is worth noting that the duration of vessels’ stay in respective ports is a vital
element in the company’s cost structure.  In order to achieve quick turnaround of
vessels and reduce wharfage dues it is imperative to properly plan and prepare pre
stowage of vessels.  Information about cargo composition should be made available
to ships’ command to facilitate preplanning in time.  Occasionally it is not
uncommon to note that, cargo on board has to be discharged first prior to
commencing loading operations into same hatch which has a negative effect on port
expenses.
However, with proper planning in effect, greater flexibility in respect of holds could
be achieved.  It is probably good if ESL considers assigning cargo superintendents,
who in close co-operation with ship’s command should work out stowage proposals
and arrange for discharging/loading programmes by closely working with stevedores
and terminals in respective ports.  It is worth seeing few operational reports in order
to highlight the need for proper planning.
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Table 4.4
Operational report
Vessel Voyage Port Day Shift No of gangs Tons
Friday 1st 1 210
Monday 1st 1 205
Monday 2nd 176
Tuesday 1st 2 202
Abbay Wonz 53 Hamburg
Tuesday 2nd 1 385
Friday 1st 1 86
Monday 1st 2 704
Monday 2nd 1 113
Tuesday 1st 1 128
Abbay Wonz 53 Bremen
Tuesday 2nd 1 339
Monday 1st 1 107
Monday 2nd 1 121
Tuesday 1st 1 232
Tuesday 2nd 1 246
Wednesday 1st 1 257
Wednesday 2nd 1 124
Thursday 1st 1 198
Thursday 2nd 1 106
Abyot 50 Hamburg
Friday 1st 1 442
Monday 1st 1 317
Monday 2nd 1 231
Tuesday 1st 1 140
Tuesday 2nd 2 154
Admas 11 Bremen
Wednesday 1st 1 339
Source: ESL data
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Having seen the above operational reports, one finds that a lot has to be done with
regard to proper planning of cargo operation.  Surprisingly, one can hardly see any of
the above vessels operating with three gangs at a time, despite the fact that all of
them have seven hatches and five holds.  For ships trading in German ports which
are more or less similar in size with the exception of M/V Tekeze, the average daily
wharfage due is about DM 8500.  Therefore, for every single day delay in these ports
about DM 8500 is always at stake.
It seems there is every reason to believe that the cargo operations of above vessels
could have been facilitated if adequate number of gangs were deployed instead of
slowing down with one gang per shift.  Presumably, at least about 50% of the
wharfage or berthing dues would have been saved if the vessels were made to work
with adequate number of gangs.  It is true that unforeseen events such as weather
conditions, technical assistance required by vessels or late arrival of cargo may
interfere into loading or discharging programmes, but nevertheless by increasing the
number of gangs per shift a fast turnaround of vessels with desired savings in cost
structure could be realised.
As a matter of fact quicker turnaround not only reduces the wharfage due but
increases the carrying capacity of the fleet as well.  Moreover, it is worth mentioning
that most of the above vessels have gone alongside during the weekends.  As the
vessels are often kept idle during the weekends, in view of avoiding overtime
payments, it doesn’t make sense to bring them to berth during the weekend.  In fact,
by avoiding weekend calls the surcharges payable would have also been avoided in
addition to the savings made by not using the berths.  Therefore, more emphasis need
to be given to the scheduling and itinerary of the vessels, to be worked out in such a
way as to keep vessels at sea during the weekends as long as practicable.  With
proper voyage planning it is possible to avoid weekend call in the first European
port, if by coincidence the vessel is to reach in the first European port from the last
Red Sea port during the weekend. Under normal conditions, for vessels trading
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between the Red Sea and North continent ports, it takes about 15 days from the last
Red Sea port mainly Djibouti to the first North continent port.
After considering all the external factors such as the sea and weather conditions, if a
vessel’s expected time of arrival at the first European port fall into the weekend the
proper action would be to adjust the expected time of arrival by slowing down and
steaming at economic speed.  This helps not only to minimise the wharfage due by
avoiding weekend call but to make savings from the bunker consumption as well.  It
is estimated that about four to five tons of fuel oil per day can be saved by steaming
at economic speed which in turn would be a saving of about USD 500 to 700 per day
depending on the bunker price.  Table 4.5 below shows weekend calls at North
continent ports in 1999.
Table 4.5
Weekend calls at North continent ports in 1999
Vessel Voy Port Berthing date Remark
Abbay Wonz 64 Hamburg Sunday 28/11 1st European port
Abbay Wonz 63 Bremen Saturday 25/9 1st European port
Abbay Wonz 63 Rotterdam Sunday 3/10
Abyot 57 Bremen Saturday 1/5 1st European port
Abyot 58 Bremen Sunday 17/7
Admas 21 Bremen Saturday 24/7 1st European port
Andinet 56 Rotterdam Sunday 17/1
Andinet 56 Hamburg Saturday 23/1
Andinet 58 Hamburg Saturday 3/7
Netsanet 55 Bremen Saturday 20/3 1st European port
Netsanet 55 Hamburg Sunday 28/3
Netsanet 56 Hamburg Saturday 5/6
Netsanet 58 Hamburg Saturday 13/11
Tekeze 2 Bremen Saturday 2/10
Source: ESL data
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As can be seen from the above table, it seems that with proper voyage and
operational planning in place, there is a potential for cost saving from port related
expenses.  In ports like Antwerp, where the wharfage due is fixed irrespective of the
duration of stay, surcharges that are payable to such ports could be reduced by
minimising weekend calls.  Where as in ports like Bremen in addition to the
surcharges the daily wharfage dues could also be avoided. After all no cargo
operation is carried out during the weekends.  Based on historical data, ESL seems to
suffer from port related delays mainly in its North continent service.  In 1998/99 the
average port stay for vessels trading in the major North continent ports was around
four to five days.  The range varies from 2.5 days in Uddevalla to about 5.5 days in
Antwerp. During the same period the average berth stays in Rotterdam, Bremen and
Hamburg were 5.3, 5.1 and 3.7 days respectively.  In the Mediterranean service the
average stay was about two days.  For the vessels trading in the Persian Gulf and
Indian subcontinent service the average stay was about 7 days.
Port related delays are noticed to be rare in the Far East service route.  During the
same period, port calls in Japan, Singapore and South Korea have been completed
within one to two working days.  Djibouti being considered as homeport, the average
port stay varied between 13 to 17 days. As most of the cargoes loaded from the
various service routes are mainly destined for Djibouti, the average stay for the
smaller vessels was about 13 days while it was about 17 days for the bigger vessels.
Surprisingly, the duration of port stay for the smaller vessels seems higher vis-à-vis
their cargo capacity.  The reason for such longer stay can be attributed to their low
cargo handling capacity.  In addition to the discharge of cargo all vessels are
expected to load outbound cargoes from this port.  Table 4.6 summarises the ports
where ESL is deemed to make savings and their average daily wharfage dues. The
other ports are excluded partly because the wharfage dues are fixed irrespective of
the duration of stay such as Antwerp, Uddevalla, etc. or the duration of stay is
reasonably acceptable such as in Yokohama, Singapore, Barcelona, etc.
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Table 4.6
Time related average wharfage due of some selected ports
PORT Average wharfage due per
day
Vessels
Hamburg DM 8500 Abyot, Abbay Wonz,
Admas, Tekeze, Andinet,
Netsanet
Bremen DM 8500 -do-          -do-
Rotterdam DFL 791 -do-           -do-
Mumbai USD 546 WelWel, Kei Kokeb,
Karamara, Omo Wonz
Djibouti (1) USD 338 Abyot, Abbay Wonz,
Admas, Tekeze, Andinet,
Netsanet
Djibouti (2) USD 195 WelWel, Kei Kokeb,
Karamara, Omo Wonz
Source. ESL data
M/t Awash has been excluded from the table because very often the cargo operation
is completed in less than 24 hours implying that there is little or no room for cost
saving.  Above figures are computed on the basis of the size of vessels calling at the
respective ports and the prevailing tariffs applicable to each port.  However, as all the
vessels calling at each port are not identical in size, an average of the various ships
size relevant to the particular port has been considered for the purpose of computing
the figures.
In 1998/99, ESL paid German Mark (DM) 546944 for wharfage/berthing due in
German ports of Hamburg and Bremen.  Considering the flexibility of the vessels
serving these ports, the quantity of cargo lifted and/or discharged and the efficiency
of these ports, it would be reasonable to set the duration of port stay at these ports
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between 2 to 2.5 days.  That is, with a proper voyage and operational planning which
includes increasing the number of gangs per shift and avoiding weekend calls when
ever possible, the average duration of stay could come down from 3.7 and 5.1 days to
around 2.5 days each at Hamburg and Bremen. Consequently the wharfage/berthing
due paid could have been reduced to DM 326774 resulting a saving of DM 220170.
For most practical reasons, the average duration of stay in Rotterdam could be set at
2 days, as it is very often the last port of call in the North continent ports.  In 1998/99
ESL paid DFL 66572 for wharfage/berthing due in the port of Rotterdam.  In the
same manner, a saving of DFL 41450 could have been made if the average duration
of stay was decreased to a bare minimum of 2 days.
With proper operational planning and cargo co-ordination the average duration of
stay in Mumbai could probably be reduced from 7 to 3.5 days.  In 1998/99 ESL paid
USD 87643 for wharfage dues in the port of Mumbai.  Based on the 3.5 days stay
about 50% of the total amount paid during 1998/99, that is, about USD 43821 could
have been saved. During the same period ESL paid USD 210178 for wharfage dues
at Djibouti.  Out of which USD 117499 was paid for the bigger vessels (Djibouti (1)
table 4.7) and the remaining USD 92679 for the smaller vessels (Djibouti (2) table
4.7).  Nevertheless, with a proper planning the average duration of stay for the
smaller vessels could reasonably be reduced from 13 to 7 days while the bigger
vessels’port stay could come down to about 10 days.  In line to this, the wharfage
due could have been reduced to USD 69117 and 49904 for the bigger and smaller
vessels respectively.
 Table 4.7 summarises the estimated saving which would have been realised from the
various ports in 1998/99 if performance standards were set based on proper
operational and voyage planning.  It is worth noting that, as cargo volumes and types
vary from voyage to voyage, performance standards have to be set on voyage to
voyage basis.  To this effect, the established standards need to be communicated with
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the ships’ command for their view and comment during the commencement of each
voyage.
Table 4.7
Estimated savings during 1998/99
Port Average
duration of
stay per
vessel
(days) in
1998/99
Actual
wharfage
due paid in
1998/99
Duration of
stay based
on
performanc
e standard
setting
(days)
Estimated
wharfage
due as per
standards
Saving
Hamburg 3.7 DM 316282 2.5 DM 213704 DM 102578
Bremen 5.1 DM 230662 2.5 DM 113070 DM 117592
Rotterdam 5.3 DFL 66572 2.0 DFL 25122 DFL 41450
Mumbai 7 USD 87642 3.5 USD 43821 USD 43821
Djibouti(1) 17 USD
117499
10 USD 69117 USD 48382
Djibouti(2) 13 USD 92679 7 USD 49904 USD 42775
Source: ESL data
4.2 Cargo handling costs
Cargo handling costs comprise all kinds of costs attributable to the cargo, such as
loading/unloading, tallying, storage and other logistical elements relating to the
cargo.  Cargo handling costs are dependent on a number of factors, such as the type
of commodity, the quantity, the ship type, the terminal and port characteristics.  They
may be divided in to two groups.
A) Basic rates per ton, per cbm or per unit: - The basic rates or tariffs are usually
negotiated and agreed between a stevedoring company and a shipping company
or in the case of state owned stevedoring company, they are fixed tariffs issued
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by the authorities.  The tariff will also specify which operations are included in
the rates and which are considered as extras and what charges in that case will be.
In the traditional liner shipping most stevedoring contracts stipulate the basic rate
per ton or per unit for normal handling of cargo during normal working hours.
For any work out side of the normal working hours extra charges are stipulated
on the contract.
B) Extra costs not covered under A:- The most commonly known extra charges in
the traditional liner shipping are:-
♦ Overtime: - with the exception of some container terminals where the rates cover
round the clock work, most stevedoring contracts are based on normal working
hours.  Any work out side the normal hours will be subject to additional
surcharges.  The applicable surcharges may vary from 10% to 100% depending
on the geographical location and the timing of the work such as holiday, Sunday,
night shift, etc.
♦ Waiting time: - Very often the stevedoring contract is based on normal conditions
what ever that may be.  If the work is interrupted for reasons beyond the
stevedore’s control, waiting time charge will be levied on the ship.  The main
causes for waiting time charge are late arrival of cargo, break down of cranes
and equipment, bad weather and late arrival of vessel.
♦ Un used time: - Some stevedoring contracts stipulate minimum guaranteed
working hours for their dockers.  Hence it is essential to properly plan in such a
way that the working period could be utilised in the best possible manner.
♦ Extra equipment & labour: - In many ports the use of equipments such as cranes,
forklifts, slings, etc are included in the basic rates.  Where as the use of mobile
cranes and heavy lifts might be considered extras and are billed for whenever
used.  In the same manner when extra men are needed for some cargo operations
extra labour charge is levied on the ship.
ESL’s operation is mainly based on the traditional port to port shipments although
some arrangements are underway to include door to door service upon request from
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shippers.  So far very few door to door services have been undertaken by the
company.  The existing fleet structure has enabled the company to be able to provide
a flexible combination of break bulk and container shipments in all its service routes.
The type of break bulk shipments handled by ESL range from the traditional bagged
cargo to various kinds of project cargoes.
In 1998/99 ESL paid Birr 37,731,000 (USD about 4,964,605) for cargo handling in
all its service routes.  This amount accounted for about 18% of the total cost incurred
by ESL during the same period.  Figure 4.2 presents cost breakdown of the company
during 1998/99.
Figure 4.2
Cost breakdown
          Source: ESL data
4.2.1 Stevedoring contracts
In ports where stevedoring tariffs are issued by government bodies such as the port
authority, there is little that can be done to reduce the official tariffs by way of
negotiating.  However, in most ports of the world, stevedoring tariffs are subject to
negotiation between the shipping company and the stevedoring company.  As a huge
amount of money is at stake, stevedoring contracts have to be negotiated with utmost
Cost breakdown during 1998/99
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care.  It is worth noting that the level of tariffs might, to a large extent, depend on the
ability to negotiate.  To this effect, it is very important to have the required
knowledge and operational details of the port prior to commencement of
negotiations.  Moreover, negotiating on the level of the basic rate alone may not be
enough, what is more important is what operations are included there in.  It is worth
to recall the old saying “ what you don’t make on tonnage, you make on dunnage”.
Suffice to say that, what matters is the total cost per ton not the basic rate per ton.
The following are some of the operations that need to be negotiated along with the
stevedoring contracts.
- Quay dues on cargo
- Tallying and delivery of goods
- Overtime charges
- Idle time
- Extra labour
- Equipment
- Lashing and securing cargo
- Opening and closing of hatches
As a matter of fact it might be possible to incorporate all the activities and negotiate
an all-inclusive rate but it might turn out to be expensive. Nevertheless, all the
normal operations should be included in the basic rate.  In some ports Saturdays and
night shift works are considered overtime works, this is the case in most European
ports.  However, when the market is offering poor returns as is the case at present for
most shipping companies, ship owners should convince stevedoring companies to
include such shifts under the normal working conditions.  In fact, it is high time for
the stevedoring companies to understand the problems and poor returns of shipping
companies and support them for the sake of mutual benefits.  After all, they are the
first to loose their jobs when shipping companies get out of business due to poor
market conditions.
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According the report compiled by the finance department, ESL has paid USD
2,282,208.66 for cargo handling in all its service routes during the second half of
1998/99 (January 1st to June 30 1999).  This figure is by far lower than the amount
paid during the first half mainly because the quantity of cargo transported during the
first half was higher than the second half.  Breakdown of the cargo handling cost
paid during the second half is presented in table 4.8.  There is no reason to doubt that
with proper voyage and operational planning, some of the costs such as early finish,
idle time, storage, shifting and stevedoring over time would have been avoided or at
least reduced to a bare minimum.
Table 4.8
Cargo handling cost breakdown during the second half of 1998/99
Cost item USD
Cargo watchman 589.59
stevedoring 1,833,034.87
Early finish 5,618.86
Equipment hire 35,639.47
Idle time 12,666.22
Storage 33,030.98
Lashing and securing 4,852.30
Tally 81,348.30
Receiving/delivery 97,277.33
Shifting 30,759.85
Stevedoring overtime 135,285.28
Trucking 12,105.61
Total 2,282,208.66
                         Source: ESL
♦ Early finish: - completing cargo operation earlier than the minimum guaranteed
period stipulated in the stevedoring contract involves additional surcharge.  For
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instance, if the minimum guaranteed period per gang per shift is seven hours and
if any one or all gangs complete their work with in four hours, the vessel pays for
the remaining three hours as per the rate agreed in the contract.  Presumably
uneven distribution of cargo is one of the reasons that lead to such extra charges.
That is, some of the holds could be heavy and others light resulting in one hold
completing early, where as another hold had to work over time.  Therefore, in
order to avoid an early finish surcharge cargo stowage need to be planned
properly.  Moreover, depending on the circumstances, attempts should be done to
switch gangs from one hold to the other whenever the work on the later hold does
not justify having a full shift gang.  In fact, ESL needs to exert maximum efforts
to avoid such surcharges during the negotiation of stevedoring contracts.
♦ Idle time: - Idle time charges include for delays caused by weather, crane
breakdown, cargo delays, etc. ESL needs to stand firm and strong while
negotiating stevedoring contracts in order to avoid idle time charges.  In line to
this, there is no reason why ESL should accept idle time charges caused by
weather as it is beyond the control of ESL.  In fact the same arguments could be
raised for idle times caused by cargo delays as well.  After all, the cargo delays
might have been caused because of labour strikes or traffic congestion which
might be peculiar to the port in which case ESL has no control what so ever.  As
ESL is being penalised by paying unnecessary wharfage dues due to the cargo
delay there seems no reason to penalise it again unless such delays are caused by
want of due diligence on the part of ESL.  Even if the delay is caused by the ship,
ESL should insist to obtain certain grace periods per gang per shift.  Say, one or
two hours per gang per shift.  Apart from the points mentioned above ESL has to
arrange a kind of in-house seminar for on-board senior officers and shore
employees directly involved with commercial operations in order to develop
awareness and make them cost conscious.  In addition to the above suggestions
more emphasis need to be given to properly co-ordinate and plan ship’s cargo
46
operation.  Apparently proper planning would also assist to avoid unnecessary
shifting costs.
♦ Storage: - In general all ESL contracts provide free storage of cargo for certain
specified time.  The free storage period varies from one port to another.  For
instance, the free storage for full containers in Hamburg is 7 days while it is 14
days in Rotterdam and so on.  Apart from attempts to increase the storage time
ESL needs to maintain its sailing schedule in order to avoid such charges.  In
1998 arrival times at North continent ports were on average 5 to 8 days later than
originally scheduled.  Table 4.9 shows the average variance for major destination
ports between their first advertised estimated time and the actual arrival date.
Table 4.9
Sailing schedule variance in 1998
Port Average arrival variance Cancelled calls (numbers)
Antwerp 5 1
Barcelona 8 5
Bremen 5 0
Hamburg 8 1
Middlesborough 6 2
Rotterdam 6 1
Uddevalla 7 0
Source: ESL data
♦ Stevedoring overtime: - stevedoring overtime cost accounted for about 6% of the
total cargo handling cost paid by ESL during the second half of 1998/99.  It is
true that at times it might be more economical to work on overtime particularly in
ports like Hamburg and Bremen where the warfare dues are deemed to be
exorbitant.  That is, if the savings from the port charge exceed the overtime
charge there is no reason why the ship should not work out side of the normal
working hours.  What is required is conducting cost/benefit analysis.  Apparently
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the kind of operations presented in tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that there is a need
for proper operational planning.  Once again the core point will be to properly
plan the voyage and cargo operations of the fleet and compare performance with
the plan.  Planning and measuring performance against plans needs to be
conducted continuously. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in order to cope with
the unemployment situation caused by containerisation and other labour saving
devices, there is a trend that many ports are trying to extend their normal working
shifts.  Therefore, ESL should try to convince stevedoring companies to extend
their normal working time.  At least efforts need to be done to include Saturdays
as a normal working day in particular in the North continent ports.
From the fore goings, at least about 50% of the extra costs paid by ESL during the
second half of 1998/99 could have possibly been saved if not avoided at all.  The
extra charges paid by ESL during the second half of 1998/99 is shown in table 4.10
below.
Table 4.10
Extra charges during the second half of 1998/99
Cost item Amount paid (USD) 50% saving
Early finish 5,618.86 2,809.43
Idle time 12,666.22 6,333.11
Storage 33,030.98 16,515.49
Shifting 30,759.85 15,379.92
Stevedoring overtime 135,285.28 67,642.64
Total 217361.19 108,680.60
            Source: ESL data
Considering the higher cargo handling cost paid during the first half (USD about
2,682,397) it is very likely that a saving of around USD 235,000 would have been
realised during 1998/99.
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4.3 Chartering-in /an alternative strategy
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the ESL fleet consists twelve vessels out of
which the four vessels operating in the Persian Gulf are relatively older and smaller
than the other vessels.  The Persian Gulf service route mainly connects Djibouti with
Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates and Mumbai in India.  This part compares the
performance of ESL vessels currently deployed in the Persian Gulf with an
alternative strategy, which is maintaining the service by chartering other vessels.
Currently this service route is served by M/v Keiy Kokeb, M/v Wolwol, Ro/Ro
Karamara and Ro/Ro Omo Wonz.  Except Ro/Ro Omo Wonz which is closer to 20
years, the remaining three vessels are over 23 years old.  In addition to their ageing,
their limited cargo handling capacity has made these vessels apparently unsuitable
for the trade they are intended to serve.  Table 4.11 shows cargo handling gears,
speed and other relevant particular of these vessels.
Basically the cargo traffic in this service route consists various types of loose
merchandise goods, drums, iron bars, steel sheets and containers.  In order to cope up
with the trade requirements it is imperative to have self sustained vessels.
Apparently none of the vessels deployed in this trade route seem to be able to lift
heavy cargo, in particular containers, with their own gears.  In view of this expensive
shore mobile cranes have to be used to accommodate such heavy cargoes.  During
the second half of 1998/99, ESL has paid USD 35640 for equipment hires in all its
service routes, about 75% of which are estimated to be incurred in the Persian Gulf
trade route.
Rough estimate indicates that the annual equipment hire in this region is about 50000
to 55000 US dollars.  To start with, Ro/Ro Karamara and Omo Wonz are not built
for the purpose they are now intended. They were purposely built for wheeled
cargoes.  Presumably, purchasing mafi trailers could have been an option to make
these vessels suitable for the purpose they are intended now.  However, as this is a
major capital expenditure, it does not give any economic sense due to their age
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factors.  Nevertheless, Ro/Ro Karamara is still comparatively better equipped than
Ro/Ro Omo Wonz as far as this service route is concerned.
Table 4.11
Relevant particulars of vessels operating in the Gulf route
VESSEL YEAR BUILT DWT GEAR SPEED*
Karamara 1976 2428 2 x 10t cranes 8.5
Omo Wonz 1981 3500 1 x 35t lift
2 x 3t lifts
9
Wolwol 1977 4135 2 x5/10t cranes
2 x10t derricks
8
Keiy Kokeb 1977 4135 2 x5/10t cranes
2 x10t derricks
8
* Average actual speed made good by respective vessels
Source: ESL data
Despite their limited capacity, frequent break down of the cargo handling gears has
so far been a major draw back on Ro/Ro Karamara, M/v Keiy Kokeb and M/v
Wolwol.  In contrast to the ro/ro vessels M/v Keiy Kokeb and Wolwol are basically
general cargo ships. Except for their cargo handling gears, size and poor technical
conditions these vessels are more or less suitable for the type of purpose they are
intended to serve.  It is also worth mentioning that spare parts for these vessels are at
times not readily available in the region they are trading, requiring spare parts to be
ordered in advance and air freighted from some where else.  In general, the repair
and maintenance cost of these vessels including Ro/Ro Omo Wonz has increased
significantly in the last few years mainly due to their ageing.  The need for frequent
repairs has not only affected the repair and maintenance cost of these vessels but also
their earning capacity due to the off hires arising from unscheduled repairs and
docking.
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In fact, the unpredictable repair periods have been one of the factors for ESL not to
be able to strictly maintain its sailing schedules.  To this effect ESL have had
difficulties in maintaining shipper credibility as the number of off hire days are
presumably higher than one could expect due to their poor technical conditions.  For
instance, in one single incident Ro/Ro Karamara has spent 128 days in a repair yard
in 1998. During the same year, the off hire days of this particular vessel could most
probably reach five to six months if all the incidents that led to off hires were
accounted for.  Consequently the need to maintain shipper credibility by providing
efficient transport services has been severely affected.
Very often, ESL has maintained the Gulf service by providing two separate service
strings for connecting Djibouti with Sharjah and Mumbai.  On an average the sea
transit time from Djibouti to Sharjah has so far been about 8 to 8.5 days and about 9
to 9.5 days to Mumbai.  The average round voyage time for each string has been
around 47 days including the off hire days.  At times attempts have been made to
connect Sharjah and Mumbai using one vessel which proved to be uneconomical due
to limited carrying capacity of the vessels.  In view of the foregoing, it would sound
economical to substitute the four vessels by two self sustained ships in the range of
7000 to 8000 dwt and an operational speed of around 14 knots each.  Due to the
financial constraints in recent years, ESL might not be in a position to purchase the
types of ships suitable for the service route. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the
financial constraints, ESL can adopt an alternative strategy to substitute its ageing
vessels presumably by chartering the kind of vessels mentioned above until such
time that its financial position improves.
4.3.1 Cost comparison
Based on the 47 days round voyage which includes off hire days, each vessel is
expected to make 7.75 voyage per annum.  That is,
365/47 = 7.75 voyages per vessel
4 x 7.75 = 31 voyages per year
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However, if two self-sustained vessels with 14 knots speed are chartered to combine
Sharjah and Mumbai in one string they will complete 23 voyages per year. That is,
Djibouti/Mumbai = 1869 miles (distance from a distance table plus 5%allowance)
Djibouti/Sharjah = 1698 miles (  -do-                       -do-                 -do-                 )
Sharjah/Mumbai = 1170 miles (  -do-                       -do-                 -do-                 )
@ 14 knots, transit time Djibouti/Sharjah = 5 days
                                      Sharjah/Mumbai = 3.5 days
                                      Mumbai/Djibouti = 5.5 days
Total transit time 14 days
Assuming 8 days in Djibouti and 4 days each in Sharjah and Mumbai
Total voyage time = 30 days
350 on hire days per year, 350/30 = 11.5 voyages per vessel per year
The sailing frequency is not adversely affected, as the two vessels will complete 23
voyages per year, more or less in line with the advertised frequency which requires
24 sailing per year.
The daily running (operating) cost of own vessels is presented in table 4.12 below.
Table 4.12
Daily running (operating) cost of own vessels
Vessel Daily running cost (USD)
Ro/Ro Karamara 1,830
Ro/Ro Omo Wonz 3,580
M/v Keiy Kokeb 3,410
M/v Wolwol 2,680
Total 11,500
Source: ESL data
As can be seen from the above table, ESL incurs USD 11,500 per day to run the four
vessels.  According to Ocean Shipping Consultants, the average daily hire for vessels
between 7500 to 15000 dwt in the second quarter of 1998 was USD 9.02/dwt/month.
Taking the average of the last four years (95 to 98) reveals an average of USD
52
11.6/dwt/month.  Therefore, if two vessels of 8000 dwt each were chartered the
average daily hire for both will be USD 6106. That is,
2 X 8000 x 11.6/30.4 = 6106
The quarterly time charter rate development during 95 to 98 is presented in table 4.13
below.
Table 4.13
General cargo vessels (7500-15000 dwt) time charter rate development 1995/98
USD/dwt/month
95 12.87
14.97
13.60
12.53
96 13.20
12.65
8.15
11.75
97 12.50
10.55
10.95
10.90
98 8.67
9.02
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants
However, as larger vessels tend to consume more bunkers than smaller vessels we
need to consider the bunker consumption for the purpose of the comparison.  Table
4.14 and table 4.15 below show estimated daily bunker consumption of own and
chartered vessels respectively.
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Table 4.14
Daily bunker consumption of own vessels (tonnes/day)
Vessel Consumption at sea
(MDO)
Consumption in port
(MDO)
Ro/Ro Karamara 4.20 0.5
Ro/Ro Omo Wonz 7.20 0.8
M/v Wolwol 4.85 0.9
M/v Keiy Kokeb 4.85 0.9
Total 21.1 3.1
Source: ESL data
Table 4.15
Typical general cargo (5000-10000 dwt) fuel consumption (tonnes /day)
                            At sea                           In port
HFO MDO HFO MDO
19.4 1.5 1.5 1.5
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants
According to Ocean Shipping Consultants the estimated daily fuel consumption level
for 8000 dwt would be 19.4 tonnes HFO and 1.5 tonnes MDO at sea and 1.5 tonnes
HFO and 1.5 tonnes MDO in port.  For the purpose of computing the cost
comparison, we will consider the price of bunkers in Singapore during 1999 as a
representative price.  According to Drewry Shipping Consultants, the average prices
of fuel and diesel oil in Singapore in 1999 were USD 68 and USD 107 respectively.
♦ Cost of running own vessels
 Based on the past experience, 35% of their service time has been spent at sea and
65% in port.  Accordingly the estimated annual bunker cost for own vessels is
computed as follows: -
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At sea,
21.1 tonnes/day x 35% x 365 x 107 = USD 288421.17
In port,
3.1 tonnes/day x 65% x 365 x 107 = USD 78695.82
                        Total bunker cost         =     USD 367,116.99
Annual running cost = 11500/day x 365 = USD 4,197,500
Annual running (operating) + bunker cost = USD 4,564,616.99
♦ Cost of running chartered vessels
To be on safe side we can assume daily hire for both vessels USD 7000/day
instead of USD 6106 as shown above.  Accordingly,
Annual charter hire expense = 350 x 7000 = USD 2,450,000 (assuming 350 days
on hire).
Assuming 16 days in port and 14 days at sea;
Bunker cost at sea will be:
2 x 19.4 x 47% x 350 x 68 = USD 434,016.80
2 x 1.5 x 47% x 350 x 107 = USD 52,804.50
Bunker cost in port:
2 x 1.5 x 53% x 350 x 68    = USD 37,842
2 x 1.5 x 53% x 350 x 107  = USD 59,545.50
Total bunker cost                 = USD 584,208.80
Annual charter hire + bunker cost = USD 3,034,208.80
Difference = 4564616.99 – 3034208.80 = USD 1,530,408.19
From the fore going, an estimated annual saving of around 1.5 million could have
been gained if the four vessels were substituted by two chartered vessels.  Even if
we try to be more conservative by allocating USD 4000 charter hire per day for
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each vessel there is still a room to save around 1.2 million per year.  Moreover, as
ESL is currently employing around 30 expatriate officers on board its ships,
getting rid of the four vessels would have enabled ESL to run all its ships by
Ethiopian officers and engineers.
4.4 Container costs
Container costs represent a significant part in a shipping line’s total cost.  They
include capital, maintenance, repositioning, storage and survey costs.  For
shipping lines an important competitive edge lies in the container management.
Apparently Container management has been one of the areas where shipping
lines have not been particularly efficient so far.  The single major cost associated
with container is repositioning cost.  That is, moving empty containers to the
loading locations.  According to Fairplay’s July 99 publication the total annual
repositioning cost has been estimated 10 billion dollars.
 “Ten billion dollars.  An astronomical figure.  But that is what one firm of
consultants estimates the total annual cost of empty container repositioning for
container operators by sea, road and rail.  Astronomical indeed, for if the dollar
notes were laid out end to end, they would stretch to the moon and back-twice.
But perhaps it is worth bringing container operators down to earth by stating that
the same number of dollar notes would encircle the equator 38 times and no
doubt clog the propellers of some ships in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans”.
(http://www.Fairplay.co.uk).
ESL is not an exception, as it is adversely affected by the imbalance of trade in
all its service routes.  The imbalances are being met either through repositioning
of empty containers or using leased containers.  Table 4.16 below shows ESL’s
imbalance of container flows during 1998.
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Table 4.16
ESL container trade imbalance 1998
(TEU)
Service route Outbound flow Inbound flow imbalance
North Continent 1346 2143 797
Mediterranean 65 458 393
Far East 13 1213 1200
Persian Gulf 19 469 450
 Source: ESL data
Apart from the imbalance of container trade, ESL also seems to suffer from poor
utilisation of containers.  Container utilisation mainly depends on container
turnover time, ship service interval, the number and capacity of ships and
container off service for repair.  However, ESL appears to suffer more from
container turnover time and ships service interval. It has been observed that
significant number of ESL containers involve long inland dwell time particularly
in the Red Sea port of Djibouti. In some circumstances an inland dwell time of
one to two years have been reported mainly due to poor container tracking and
follow-up.  Nevertheless, a dwell time of three to four months is common for
most containers. Some of the main factors contributing to longer inland dwell
time are:
- Poor container tracking and follow-up.
- Provisions in the leasing agreement that limit the number of containers to be
redelivered to a leasing company at any one time.
- Inadequate service schedule particularly in the Far East service, where it has
become a problem to re-position empty boxes.
57
In view of the above, ESL has become highly dependent on the use of leased
containers which given their daily hire, delivery and redelivery costs create
significant expenditure.
As shown in table 4.16, in 1998, ESL moved 5726 teus in all its service routes.
To accomplish this task ESL has managed around 2642 teu (2062 own and 580
leased containers). Apparently, these figures indicate poor container management
and inefficient use of containers by ESL.  Due to the significant imbalances of
container trade, ESL incurs substantial repositioning cost for its own boxes and
leasing charge for hired boxes.  Though it has been difficult to quantify
repositioning costs due to the absence of compiled data, substantial amount of
money is estimated to have been spent in simply moving empty boxes.  Due to
the structural trade imbalances no one assumes that repositioning moves would
be prevented.  However, with improved container management substantial cost
could be saved.  One of the ways to improve container management is through
co-operative arrangements with other lines.  As huge number of similar type of
empty containers are moving both into and out of several of the same world
ports, there is a huge potential for substantial savings if lines co-operate to make
use of one’s container by the other.
“The liner shipping industry; an industry that for too long has fooled itself into
believing that making deals with other lines and using their equipment was some
how intrinsically wrong.  The principle is straight forward and is simply a case of
one operator with an equipment deficit in a specific area making use of
equipment controlled by another operator which has a surplus and when the
cargo movement is completed, returning the container to a mutually acceptable
location”  (Fairplay July 29, 1999).
Having seen the trade imbalance, many of the containers unloaded in Djibouti are
repositioned at a high cost to either loading or redelivery locations, in the case of
58
leased containers.  Therefore, in order to minimise the repositioning cost and
daily hires of leased containers, ESL needs to make a deal with other lines in
particular with those who have imbalance of trade on the opposite direction.
That is, as ESL is relatively weak on the export side it can make an arrangement
with those who run short of empty units in Djibouti to make use of its equipments
and deliver the units at mutually agreed ports.  At the same time ESL can also
make use of other line’s empty units to be delivered in Djibouti.  Moreover, as
the inland dwell time of empty containers appears to be high in Djibouti, ESL
should improve its container management in this port.  Due to poor container
management, often, it has been noted that late coming containers which could
still enjoy free storage time being used for export cargo or moved to loading
locations before those which are already overdue.
At times the sales (cargo booking) people do not seem to be aware of the full cost
implications of their decisions.  The result is that, containers are supplied without
due regard to the cost of an empty move, daily hire, pick-up and delivery charges
or whether the shipment even warrants the expenditure or not.  Therefore, the
sales people need to work with the container section in order to avoid
unnecessary costs, in particular for shipments destined to or originated from out
port calls.
Although ESL’s core business is providing port to port shipments, occasionally it
undertakes door to door shipments when requested by shippers.  In such instants,
the clearing and custom formalities are handled by the Marketing staff who has
limited knowledge and experience in clearing goods.  As this will affect container
related expenses, such as storage, container handling cost, etc. it would be
economical if ESL considers to out source such activities to third party service
providers who have the required knowledge and expertise in clearing and custom
formalities.
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Chapter V
The effects of global trends
This chapter looks in brief at the on going major global trends and their effect on the
liner shipping in general and ESL in particular.  The evolution in the liner shipping
during the last few years is that many smaller national and regional niche players
have been disappearing from the market because of bankruptcy or other economic
reasons.  The future doesn’t look promising either.  Similar to the smaller liner
operators, smaller shippers are also disappearing from the scene.  The disappearance
of smaller companies is accelerated by their inefficiencies to cope up with on going
global trends.  The major global trends include:
♦ Globalisation
♦ Alliances, mergers and acquisitions
♦ Deregulation
♦ Increasing vessel sizes
♦ Logistics management
5.1 Globalisation
Globalisation can be described as a trend towards greater integration of the world
economy through the flow of goods, services and capital around the world.
According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), three key tendencies can be
identified as the driving force of globalisation.  “The first, and perhaps most
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profound influence, is technological change.  Second, an increasing number of
governments have pursued liberalisation policies, opening markets and removing
regulatory obstacles to economic activity.  Third, the combination of new
technologies and freer markets has enabled the business sectors in a growing number
of countries to internationalise their activities, an ever more intricate web of inter-
linked activities around the globe.  Between them, these forces have made nations
more economically interdependent, creating unprecedented opportunities as well as
new economic, political and social challenges”.  (WTO, 1998).
These factors have forced producers to look for strategies that would allow them to
exploit all available resources to strengthen their competitive edge in the
international market.  Such strategies include outsourcing and processing of different
parts of various products in different locations in order to minimise resource cost or
to have easier market accesses.  This has resulted in the increase of the volume of
trade and changed the structure of production, resource allocation and distribution of
goods and services in such a way that would minimise the transaction costs and
maximise efficiency and profits.
Due to the economic globalisation, world trade has consistently out paced world
GDP growth.  Apparently, the liner shipping, in particular container shipping appears
to be closely connected with the liberalisation and globalisation of world trade.  This
situation has forced liner operators to adjust and rearrange themselves in order to
meet the trade requirements, as transport users seem to say that they want a deal with
fewer first class service providers on broader geographical basis.  This has led
shipping companies in particular container operators to be big enough and diversify
their activities in order to meet customers’ requirements.  Apart from meeting the
trade requirements, shipping companies need to be big enough in order to be quoted
on the stock exchange and attract employees, as people prefer to work for large
companies due to the normal human nature or attitude.
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In the 1990s, many of the traditional liner operators went out of the liner trade
because they were not able to compete with big carriers operating fully containerised
vessels.  Those who have managed to stay in the business are in their critical stage of
development. Consequently their fleet is getting old, as they are not making enough
money from their operations to reinvest on ships.
5.2 Alliances, mergers and acquisitions
Ocean going ships are becoming bigger and more expensive.  The need for wider
geographical coverage, higher frequency and economies of scale in international
liner shipping has made it difficult for a lot of shipowners including the mega
carriers to satisfy the market requirements individually. One of the strategies to
obtain economies of scale and scope is through strategic alliance where by shipping
companies basically agree for better utilisation of assets through shared resources.
Alliances are a kind of consortia with the main objective based on technical
agreements between container operators having similar philosophies and scale of
operation.  So far the major alliances operating around the globe are:
- Grand alliance: P&O Nedlloyd, NYK, HappagLloyd, OOCL, MISC
- Maersk/SeaLand: Maersk/SeaLand
- New World alliance: APL(NOL), MOL, Hyundai
- COSCO, K-Line, Yangming
- United alliance: Hanjin, DSR-Senator, Choyang, UASC
Even though there are clear advantages to be achieved from the realisation of
economies of scale and scope, maintaining alliances in container liner shipping has
been difficult due to the economies of single organisations and diseconomies of joint
ventures.  Hence the rules of the game in container liner shipping are shifting from
mere co-operation in the form of alliance and joint ventures to take-overs
(acquisitions) and mergers.  At present it is not uncommon to see significant cross
border and multi national deals around the globe.  Apparently, the trend of
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globalisation will speed up the process of consolidation already underway in a more
profound manner.
“If the size and scope of recent corporate megadeals have taken your breath away,
fasten your seat belt.  The race is just getting started.  Given the activity we’ve
already seen, that may seem startling.  In 1996, 211 megadeals (mergers and
acquisitions worth more than $1 billion) were announced.  By 1999 that figure had
risen to 476.  Overall announced volume rose to more than $3.8 trillion. The most
impressive growth was in cross-border activity which surged from $314 billion to
$1.2 trillion in announced deals”.  (Newsweek January 31, 2000).  In line to this
development, major structural changes have taken place with in the shipping industry
in general and container liner shipping in particular.
As the global trends are becoming irresistible, they are driving consolidation within
the liner shipping industry.  The trend in globalisation is going to continue, hence
shipping companies in particular container operators have to be big enough to be able
to provide tailor made services to customers.  Surprisingly, in 20 to 30 years time 5
to 6 giant liner operators are expected to operate in the world.  Over the past few
years the industry has experienced an increasing number of take-overs and mergers.
To mention some:
- In 1996, Safmarine formed the joint venture Safmarine CMBT lines (SCL) with
Belgian carrier CMBT and CMA bought French State owned CGM.
- In 1997, the merger of P&O containers and Nedlloyd lines became effective,
Hanjin took over 80% of DSR-senator’s shares and Neptune Orient Lines (NOL)
acquired American President Lines (APL).
- In 1998, Evergreen acquired Italian carrier Lloyd Triestino.
- In 1999, Maersk acquired Safmarine container lines and Sealand.
5.3 Deregulation
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In the past few years many countries around the globe have gone through economic
reforms.  Due to the internal and external pressures, many of them are transforming
from the closed and highly regulated economy to a free market economy.  The
process of change is still underway though it has not been as fast and drastic as the
World Bank or World Trade Organisation would like it to be.  Deregulation of the
transportation industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s assisted organisations to
have many more options.  This has increased the competition within and between
modes of transportation.  Consequently carriers became more creative, flexible,
customer-focused and competitive in order to succeed.  Since there are more
transportation options shippers can now focus on the rate negotiations, terms and
conditions in order to secure the best transportation service at the lowest possible
cost.
De-regulation in the shipping industry has seriously affected the role of conference
systems.  In the 1960s and 1970s liner companies were in a strong position through
their conference systems by establishing a kind of cartel in order to restrict and
abolish competition.  However, by the late 80s and 90s conferences had become
seriously weakened due to the expansion of containerisation and the less
sympathetic regulatory environments around the world.  Such regulations include
the 1984 shipping act and the 1998 ocean shipping reform act in the US.  In fact,
deregulation is one of the driving forces that led shipping companies to switch their
strategies into alliances and mergers.  De-regulation in the industry includes:
- Shippers and ocean carriers are allowed to negotiate and reach confidential
service contracts.
- Prohibition of capacity management programmes
- Elimination of tariff filling requirements
- Elimination of anti-competitive practices etc.
Moreover, recent developments indicate that the protectionist and discriminatory
policy which had been pursued by most developing countries to protect their
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national lines is on the verge of disappearing due to the change in economy policies.
As a result most national shipping lines are exposed to fierce competition.
5.4 Increasing vessel sizes
The liner shipping is being dictated by the need to reduce unit cost.  In this regard
the trend has been towards bigger ships which offer economies of scale.  It is
cheaper to construct and operate a 2000 teu vessel than two 1000 teu each vessels, as
the price and operating cost of a 2000 teu vessel will not be double of the 1000 teu
vessel though the earning capacity is apparently twice that of the 1000 teu vessel.
 However, even though the unit cost of bigger vessels is lower than the smaller
vessels the investment required to own them is still huge.  Due to the high barrier to
entry most of the developing countries are no more participating in the liner
business.  Between 1950 and 1995, the total number of ships increased by about 2.6
times while the gross tonnage of ships increased by about 5.7 times during the same
period (ISL 1997).  Figure 5.1 presents the consistent growth of vessels during the
last five decades.
Figure 5.1
Structural change in world fleet
           Source: ISL 1999
5.5 Logistics management
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“Logistics is the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost
effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods, and
related information from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of
conforming to customer requirements.” (Council of Logistics Management (CLM),
USA, 1992).  The existing fierce competition has caused shipping companies to look
for new ways to differentiate their service from others.  To this effect, logistics is a
logical choice to look at, because bigger and well established liner operators should
be able to provide much more reliable logistics solution and value added services
than smaller and conventional liner operators.
Factors contributing to the growing interest in logistics include:
- The advances in information technology
- An increased emphasis on customer service
- Growing recognition of the total cost concept
- The realisation that logistics can be used as a strategic weapon in competition
- The profit leverage from logistics
Not all shipping companies can provide logistics service to their customers.
Apparently, as customers keep on demanding better service and lower costs, those
who can differentiate their service through better logistics management can survive
and prosper in the present highly competitive environment.  The focus of logistics is
on co-ordination across the entire supply chain, both within a corporation and
linking backward to suppliers and forward to end consumers.  The ability to
respond rapidly to constant changes will emerge as a major competitive edge
among shipping companies.
 It is worth noting that at present shipping companies make profit not from the
increase of revenue but from excellent supply chain management, which includes
efficiency, rationalisation, information technology, etc.  By giving unique services
to customers, shipping companies could ensure long term strategic partnership with
customers.  Surprisingly, the consequence of such development has given rise to the
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emergence of virtual organisations.  Thanks to the Internet technology, at present
few powerful supply chain specialists are offering transport service/logistics service
without owning a single vessel.
5.6 The challenges for ESL
The consolidation taking place within the industry coupled with the other global
trends discussed above have become of great concern for ESL’s future liner
operation.  Due to the change in the economy policy of the government, ESL is no
more in a position to enjoy the support it used to have in the form of cargo
reservation.  The old conference that ESL belonged to, (Red Sea, UK and Continent
conference) has disappeared since the early 80s although ESL have continued to use
the tariff published by the conference until the early 90s.
The global players serving the Ethiopian trade (namely MSC, P&O Nedlloyds and
Maersk/Sea Land) do offer more competitive freight rates and higher frequency of
sailing than ESL due to their economies of scale.  The economies of scale exist on
both the vessel size and on the organisational side (scale and scope of the
companies).  With respect to the vessel size, the unit/slot cost of the competitor lines
is by far lower than ESL as they are operating bigger, faster and fully containerised
vessels.  With respect to the organisational side, economies of scale can be realised
in all business processes such as container logistics and IT systems and support.  The
advantage comprises the following factors:
- Larger ships with higher speeds and thus more round voyages per year and
improved schedule.
- Substantial reduction in container expenses that is, reduced imbalances due to
scope of coverage, lower leasing rates and optimised container depots.
- Reduction in stevedoring contracts.  For instance, the port authority of Djibouti
charges ESL USD 115 per teu whilst it charges the competitor lines USD 85 per
teu.
- Reduction in procurement (bunkers, stores, etc).
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- Reduction in communication cost due to IT interlinks with customers while ESL
still very much dependent on telefax, telex and telephone.
- Reduction in overhead/administration expenses (spreading overhead and
communication costs over a large volume of cargo).
Moreover, the global players are consolidating their marketing position by opening
representative offices in the capital city.  In 1998/99, ESL’s market share dropped by
13% as compared to the preceding year even though the country’s general cargo sea
borne trade has increased by 14% during the same period.  In parallel with alliances,
mergers, acquisitions and deregulation taking place within the industry, freight rates
are substantially decreasing from time to time.  ESL cannot be a global player
because of its fleet structure, marketing capacity and business philosophy. In addition
to this, it does not seem to be able to offer logistics solution to its customers in the
foreseeable future. As it is now, ESL is not making profit from its operations. In the
face of the on going global trends the future does not seem attractive either.  On the
other hand the ageing fleet needs to be replaced in three to five years time, where as
the competition only seems to be getting tougher.  In view of these developments
ESL appears to have reached in its critical stage of development.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
In the present competitive market, cost reduction is a key to survival hence it is of
prime interest to all shipping companies.  “The best way to make money is to stop
losing it” seems to be a good proverb. Due to this fact, the liner shipping is being
dictated by the need to reduce costs. We are living in a time of dynamic global
growth and development.  Apparently nothing seems closely connected with the
liberalisation and globalisation of world trade as the shipping industry.  Hence,
shipping companies in particular container operators are getting bigger by forming
alliances, merging or taking over others. This situation is accelerated by the economy
deregulation taking part in most parts of the world.  Parallel to this development,
freight rates have continued to fall due to fierce competition and volume focused
sales philosophy of the global players.  Moreover, the global players are making use
of their advance in information technology and logistics management to differentiate
their services.  As a result national and regional niche players are on the verge of
disappearing.
The Ethiopian Shipping Lines is not an exception.  ESL has already started feeling
severe financial constraints.  Being a small company, ESL cannot be part of any
strategic alliance due to its fleet structure, scope of coverage and business
philosophy.  As freight rates are falling down, it is imperative for ESL to check the
rising costs by establishing proper cost control system and looking for potential
savings by implementing cost effective measures.  In this respect, the Marketing
department responsible for the commercial operation needs to properly plan the
voyage and cargo operations of each vessel.  As vessels are often kept idle during the
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weekend they shouldn’t come along side during the weekend whenever practical.
The advantages of proper planning include:
♦ Avoidance of weekend calls hence less berthing dues.
♦ Possible savings from bunker consumption, as vessels might be required to
proceed at economical speed.
♦ Increase the cargo capacity of the fleet and decrease port related expenses as
proper cargo planning facilitates fast turnaround of vessels.
In order to realise the above advantages the Marketing department needs to
establish performance standards of each port of call. When setting the
performance standard, one needs to consider the productivity and efficiency of
the port, the type of vessel and the quantity and type of cargo.  Areas of operation
where standards are not achieved should be identified, analysed and corrected.
Moreover, the department should also review the standards where and when
necessary.  With proper planning and standard setting, an estimated saving of
around USD 280,000 from time dependent berthing dues and around USD
235,000 from cargo related expenses could have been realised during 1998/99
budget year.
Furthermore, as a huge amount of money is at stake, stevedoring contracts need
to be negotiated with utmost care.  What is important during the stevedoring
agreements is not the basic rate alone but also what is included therein.  It is
possible to agree a very low basic rate with some vital operations excluded.
However, what matters at the end of the day is the total cost per ton not the basic
tariff per ton.
Currently ESL serves the Persian Gulf and Mumbai by deploying four old
smaller vessels namely, Keiy Kokeb, Wolwol, Karamara and Omo Wonz.  These
vessels are technically in poor condition.  In addition to their ageing, their limited
cargo handling capacity has made these vessels unsuitable for the trade they are
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intended to serve.  The need for frequent unscheduled repairs and docking has
not only affected the repair and maintenance cost but their carrying capacity as
well.  The unpredictable repair periods have been one of the factors for ESL not
to be able to maintain its sailing schedule.  Therefore, it sounds economical to
substitute these vessels by two self-sustained ships in the range of 7000 to 8000
dwt each.  The estimated saving from the substitution could reach around USD
1.5 million per year.
The other cost element requiring attention is container-related expense.  In
today’s liner shipping, an important competitive edge lies in the management of
containers.  ESL is adversely affected by imbalance of trade in all its service
routes.  The imbalances are met by either repositioning of empty containers or
using leased containers.  Apart from the imbalance of trade, ESL also seems to
suffer from poor utilisation of containers.  Though it has been difficult to
quantify repositioning expense due to lack of adequate data, significant amount
of money is estimated to have been spent in moving empty containers.
Therefore, in order to alleviate the problems the following measures need to be
considered:
♦ To make a deal with other lines, in particular with those who have
imbalance of trade in the opposite direction to make use of equipments and
deliver same at mutually agreed ports.
♦ Arrange in house seminars and training for employee in order to make them
cost conscious and aware of the implications of their decisions.
♦ Proper follow-up of containers.
Based on the cost reduction scheme mentioned, an estimated saving of around 2,3
million USD could have been realised in 1998/99.  This saving which is about 6.7%
of the total cost incurred by ESL during 1998/99, would have been sufficient to
offset the loss declared by the company during the same period.
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